Table 5 The lagged effects of HPR policy implementation on corporate innovation
From: Home purchase restriction, real estate investment, and corporate innovation
Variable | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
Y = REit | Y = RDit | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{1_{ijt}} \) | −0.9184 | 0.1408 |
(−1.056) | (1.151) | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{2_{ijt}} \) | −2.0081** | 0.3882*** |
(−1.963) | (2.586) | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{3_{ijt}} \) | −3.9815*** | 0.4705*** |
(−3.552) | (3.120) | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{4_{ijt}} \) | −3.3672** | 0.3564** |
(−2.392) | (2.246) | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{5_{ijt}} \) | −3.7494** | 0.3239* |
(−2.479) | (1.851) | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{6_{ijt}} \) | −3.3185** | 0.3682** |
(−2.176) | (2.028) | |
\( HPR\_{S}_{7_{ijt}} \) | −3.1270** | 0.4568* |
(−2.147) | (1.854) | |
Sizeit | −0.0319 | 0.6909*** |
(−0.340) | (15.227) | |
LEVit | 0.3309* | −0.1341 |
(1.811) | (−0.910) | |
Growthit | 0.0473 | 0.0166 |
(0.758) | (0.639) | |
ROAit | 0.1587 | 0.6390** |
(0.579) | (2.405) | |
Top5it | −0.0088 | 0.5950*** |
(−0.021) | (3.412) | |
Stateit | −0.0285 | −0.2197* |
(−0.179) | (−1.898) | |
Constant | 3.4641 | 1.2472 |
(1.511) | (1.155) | |
Industry FE | YES | YES |
Firm FE | YES | YES |
Year FE | YES | YES |
No. of obs. | 11,786 | 11,786 |
Number of firms | 1830 | 1830 |
R2: within | 0.1029 | 0.4654 |