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Table 5 The lagged effects of HPR policy implementation on corporate innovation

From: Home purchase restriction, real estate investment, and corporate innovation

Variable (1) (2)
Y = REit Y = RDit
\( HPR\_{S}_{1_{ijt}} \) −0.9184 0.1408
(−1.056) (1.151)
\( HPR\_{S}_{2_{ijt}} \) −2.0081** 0.3882***
(−1.963) (2.586)
\( HPR\_{S}_{3_{ijt}} \) −3.9815*** 0.4705***
(−3.552) (3.120)
\( HPR\_{S}_{4_{ijt}} \) −3.3672** 0.3564**
(−2.392) (2.246)
\( HPR\_{S}_{5_{ijt}} \) −3.7494** 0.3239*
(−2.479) (1.851)
\( HPR\_{S}_{6_{ijt}} \) −3.3185** 0.3682**
(−2.176) (2.028)
\( HPR\_{S}_{7_{ijt}} \) −3.1270** 0.4568*
(−2.147) (1.854)
Sizeit −0.0319 0.6909***
(−0.340) (15.227)
LEVit 0.3309* −0.1341
(1.811) (−0.910)
Growthit 0.0473 0.0166
(0.758) (0.639)
ROAit 0.1587 0.6390**
(0.579) (2.405)
Top5it −0.0088 0.5950***
(−0.021) (3.412)
Stateit −0.0285 −0.2197*
(−0.179) (−1.898)
Constant 3.4641 1.2472
(1.511) (1.155)
Industry FE YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
No. of obs. 11,786 11,786
Number of firms 1830 1830
R2: within 0.1029 0.4654
  1. Notes. ***, **, and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; parentheses are t values (thereinafter)