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Table 4 Signaling effect of ESOPs on crash risk

From: Employee stock ownership plan and stock price crash risk

Variable

DEPS

Punish

Lawsuit

NCSKEW (1)

DUVOL (2)

NCSKEW (3)

DUVOL (4)

NCSKEW (5)

DUVOL (6)

ESOPi,t-1 × DEPSi,t

−0.002b

− 0.002c

    

(−2.28)

(−3.52)

    

ESOP i,t-1 ×Punish i,t

  

−0.008b

−0.015b

  
  

(−2.51)

(−1.98)

  

ESOP i,t-1 ×Lawsuit i,t

    

−0.005c

−0.010b

    

(−3.01)

(−2.27)

ESOP i,t-1

−0.027b

−0.04b

− 0.027b

−0.044c

− 0.023b

−0.035b

(−2.13)

(− 2.57)

(− 2.17)

(−3.09)

(−2.01)

(− 2.05)

DEPS i,t

0.002a

0.002a

    

(1.93)

(1.68)

    

Punish i,t

  

0.059b

0.019b

  
  

(1.91)

(2.48)

  

Lawsuit i,t

    

0.066a

0.040c

    

(1.82)

(3.48)

Dturn i,t-1

0.011

0.008

0.008

0.007

0.008

0.007

(1.47)

(1.51)

(1.09)

(1.22)

(1.11)

(1.23)

Hret i,t-1

0.725c

0.54c

0.723c

0.527c

0.724c

0.527c

(11.85)

(11.21)

(12.21)

(11.21)

(12.24)

(11.21)

Sigma i,t-1

−3.676a

−1.761

−2.902

−1.239

−3.092

− 1.343

(−1.70)

(− 1.10)

(− 1.38)

(−0.79)

(− 1.47)

(− 0.86)

MB i,t-1

0.023c

0.011b

0.016c

0.009c

0.016c

0.009c

(3.67)

(2.42)

(3.69)

(2.90)

(3.74)

(2.93)

Size i,t-1

−0.004

− 0.023a

− 0.012

− 0.024b

− 0.012

− 0.023a

(− 0.26)

(−1.83)

(− 0.75)

(− 1.97)

(− 0.75)

(− 1.96)

Lev i,t-1

0.158a

0.061

0.118

0.039

0.114

0.036

(1.91)

(0.99)

(1.50)

(0.68)

(1.46)

(0.62)

ROA i,t-1

−0.033c

− 0.034c

− 0.028c

− 0.031c

−0.027c

− 0.03c

(−5.04)

(−6.96)

(−4.40)

(−6.49)

(−4.27)

(−6.38)

DA i,t-1

−0.127

−0.085

− 0.158

− 0.113

− 0.163

−0.116

(−1.16)

(−1.05)

(− 1.49)

(− 1.44)

(− 1.53)

(− 1.48)

NCSKEW i,t-1

0.093c

 

0.09c

 

0.09c

 

(5.95)

 

(5.88)

 

(5.87)

 

DUVOL i,t-1

 

0.105c

 

0.103c

 

0.103c

 

(6.21)

 

(6.22)

 

(6.20)

Intercept

0.164

0.626b

0.304

0.615b

0.296

0.606b

(0.41)

(2.09)

(0.80)

(2.18)

(0.78)

(2.15)

Fix_ind

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Fix_time

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adj-R 2

0.1492

0.1771

0.1503

0.1768

0.1509

0.1773

No. of obs.

4634

4634

4832

4832

4832

4832

  1. Notes. This table presents results of the relationship between ESOPs and crash risk when firms’ negative information is disclosed, estimated by the equation:
  2. \( {CrashRisk}_{i,t}={\alpha}_0+{\alpha}_1\times {ESOP}_{i,t-1}\times {Signal}_{i,t-1}+{\alpha}_2\times {ESOP}_{i,t-1}+{\alpha}_3\times {Signal}_{i,t-1}+{\alpha}_4\times Control\kern0.3em {Variables}_{t-1}+{\varepsilon}_{i,t}, \)
  3. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Time and industry fixed effects are included. Here a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively