From: Can returnee managers promote CSR performance? Evidence from China
 | Y = Tobin’s Q1 i,t | Y = Tobin’s Q2 i,t | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
CSR_Score i,t | 0.007*** | Â | 0.006*** | Â |
(6.87) | Â | (6.55) | Â | |
CSR_Level i,t | Â | 0.179*** | Â | 0.170*** |
 | (7.36) |  | (7.07) | |
Returnee (0/1) i,t | 0.237*** | 0.233*** | 0.233*** | 0.230*** |
(4.44) | (4.38) | (4.37) | (4.31) | |
State control (0/1) i,t | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.026 | 0.026 |
(0.17) | (0.18) | (0.27) | (0.28) | |
Board Independence i,t | 1.320*** | 1.323*** | 1.355*** | 1.357*** |
(3.41) | (3.43) | (3.54) | (3.56) | |
Power balance i,t | −0.005** | −0.005** | −0.005** | −0.005** |
(−2.53) | (−2.45) | (−2.54) | (−2.46) | |
Duality (0/1) i,t | −0.004 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.004 |
(−0.09) | (−0.10) | (−0.08) | (−0.09) | |
Managerial ownership i,t | −0.279** | −0.265** | −0.253* | −0.240* |
(−2.09) | (−1.99) | (−1.91) | (−1.82) | |
Institutional ownership i,t | 0.390*** | 0.390*** | 0.390*** | 0.390*** |
(4.58) | (4.59) | (4.59) | (4.60) | |
Firm age i,t | 0.007* | 0.007* | 0.007* | 0.007* |
(1.68) | (1.68) | (1.78) | (1.77) | |
Size i,t | −0.795*** | −0.791*** | −0.776*** | −0.773*** |
(−35.23) | (−35.96) | (−33.98) | (−34.67) | |
ROA i,t | 3.204*** | 3.424*** | 3.054*** | 3.264*** |
(8.86) | (9.63) | (8.47) | (9.22) | |
Leverage i,t | −0.140 | −0.155 | −0.678*** | −0.692*** |
(−1.47) | (−1.64) | (−6.98) | (−7.17) | |
Intercept | 19.364*** | 19.034*** | 18.920*** | 18.611*** |
(38.42) | (39.11) | (37.35) | (38.03) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 9428 | 9428 | 9295 | 9295 |
Adjusted R-squared | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.52 |