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Table 11 CSR and Firm Value

From: Can returnee managers promote CSR performance? Evidence from China

 

Y = Tobin’s Q1 i,t

Y = Tobin’s Q2 i,t

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

CSR_Score i,t

0.007***

 

0.006***

 

(6.87)

 

(6.55)

 

CSR_Level i,t

 

0.179***

 

0.170***

 

(7.36)

 

(7.07)

Returnee (0/1) i,t

0.237***

0.233***

0.233***

0.230***

(4.44)

(4.38)

(4.37)

(4.31)

State control (0/1) i,t

0.016

0.016

0.026

0.026

(0.17)

(0.18)

(0.27)

(0.28)

Board Independence i,t

1.320***

1.323***

1.355***

1.357***

(3.41)

(3.43)

(3.54)

(3.56)

Power balance i,t

−0.005**

−0.005**

−0.005**

−0.005**

(−2.53)

(−2.45)

(−2.54)

(−2.46)

Duality (0/1) i,t

−0.004

−0.004

−0.003

−0.004

(−0.09)

(−0.10)

(−0.08)

(−0.09)

Managerial ownership i,t

−0.279**

−0.265**

−0.253*

−0.240*

(−2.09)

(−1.99)

(−1.91)

(−1.82)

Institutional ownership i,t

0.390***

0.390***

0.390***

0.390***

(4.58)

(4.59)

(4.59)

(4.60)

Firm age i,t

0.007*

0.007*

0.007*

0.007*

(1.68)

(1.68)

(1.78)

(1.77)

Size i,t

−0.795***

−0.791***

−0.776***

−0.773***

(−35.23)

(−35.96)

(−33.98)

(−34.67)

ROA i,t

3.204***

3.424***

3.054***

3.264***

(8.86)

(9.63)

(8.47)

(9.22)

Leverage i,t

−0.140

−0.155

−0.678***

−0.692***

(−1.47)

(−1.64)

(−6.98)

(−7.17)

Intercept

19.364***

19.034***

18.920***

18.611***

(38.42)

(39.11)

(37.35)

(38.03)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

9428

9428

9295

9295

Adjusted R-squared

0.49

0.49

0.52

0.52

  1. Notes. (1) ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, using two tailed tests. (2) We report in parentheses t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered within firm, and are robust to heteroscedasticity. (3) All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. (4) See Appendix A for variable definitions