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Shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises and control

Abstract

One of the most commonly used ways to restructure big and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China is through shareholding reform. This article classifies the shareholding reform into four modes and explores the relationship among these modes, in terms of the degree of control over controlled listed companies and governance efficiency. Using data of 285 SOEs during 1997–2000 (three years after their IPO), we find that restructuring modes affect the degree of control by controlling shareholders over listed companies. Furthermore, the controlling shareholder of incompletely restructured enterprises prefers a higher degree of control. In addition, the higher the degree of control, the more serious the problems of related trading and tunneling behaviors. We also find that restructuring modes affect the governance structure of listed companies, which in turn affect the degree of related trading and tunneling behaviors. These findings reveal that incomplete restructuring of SOEs before their listing is likely to make these enterprises be vulnerable to external control and thus negatively affects their governance efficiency.

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Correspondence to Jianping Deng.

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Translated from Nankai Guanli Pinglun 南开管理评论 (Nankai Business Review), 2008, 11(2): 4–14

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Deng, J., Zeng, Y. & He, J. Shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises and control. Front. Bus. Res. China 4, 185–208 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11782-010-0009-z

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Keywords

  • state-owned enterprises
  • shareholding reform
  • control