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How to improve the performance of R&D alliance? An empirical analysis based on China’s pharmaceutical industry

Abstract

The separation of science resources and the manufacturing industry in China has given rise to R&D alliances between R&D institutes and sponsoring enterprises. As a result, R&D alliance of various types has become a main route of technology innovation in China. Drawing upon relevant literature on R&D alliance management, this research empirically explores the impacts of relationship pattern, control strategy chosen by sponsoring enterprises, and alliance members’ continuity expectation on alliance performance. Results show that motivation-based alliance control approaches, including proper allocation of alliance control rights, sustained strengthening of alliance members’ continuity expectation, and enhancement of mutual relationship and friendship among alliance members, are more effective than process or outcome control approaches for improving alliance performance.

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Correspondence to Xiaofeng Xiang.

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Translated from Guanli Xuejia 管理学家 (学术版) (Management Magazine (Academic)), 2008, (4): 316–326

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Liu, X., Xiang, X., Jiang, L. et al. How to improve the performance of R&D alliance? An empirical analysis based on China’s pharmaceutical industry. Front. Bus. Res. China 4, 130–147 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11782-010-0006-2

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Keywords

  • control
  • trust
  • relationship governance
  • continuity expectation
  • alliance performance