Open Access

Determinants of related-party transactions: Evidence from China’s listed companies during 2002–2006

Frontiers of Business Research in ChinaSelected Publications from Chinese Universities20093:10

Received: 8 December 2008

Published: 23 May 2009


This study attempts to shed light on the relationship between related-party (RP) transactions and internal governance factors of China’s listed companies. An analysis of a sample of 69 049 RP transactions during 2002–2006 reveals strong evidence that the likelihood of RP transactions is higher for companies with high concentration of ownership, but lower for companies with strong bargaining power of the second and third largest shareholders. There is also clear evidence showing that large compensation for outside directors is associated with greater size of RP transactions, whereas increased average compensation for the three top executives tends to decrease the number of RP transactions. Our results also reveal that the pluralism arraignment, i.e. the same person holding both positions of the board chairman and the chief executive, increases the size of RP transactions significantly. This finding suggests that pluralism reduces the balance of power in corporate governance.


related-party transactionsownership structurecorporate governanceinvestor protection