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Determinants of related-party transactions: Evidence from China’s listed companies during 2002–2006


This study attempts to shed light on the relationship between related-party (RP) transactions and internal governance factors of China’s listed companies. An analysis of a sample of 69 049 RP transactions during 2002–2006 reveals strong evidence that the likelihood of RP transactions is higher for companies with high concentration of ownership, but lower for companies with strong bargaining power of the second and third largest shareholders. There is also clear evidence showing that large compensation for outside directors is associated with greater size of RP transactions, whereas increased average compensation for the three top executives tends to decrease the number of RP transactions. Our results also reveal that the pluralism arraignment, i.e. the same person holding both positions of the board chairman and the chief executive, increases the size of RP transactions significantly. This finding suggests that pluralism reduces the balance of power in corporate governance.


为了研究我国上市公司内部治理因素对其关联交易的影响, 基于 2002–2006 年期间国内上市公司披露的 69 049 笔重大关联交易的样本, 回归分析发现: 上市公司股权越集中, 关联交易规模就越大; 独立董事津贴与关联交易规模呈现正相关关系, 表明独立董事津贴的增加会导致其对关联交易监督作用的减弱; 第二与第三大股东制衡力量的存在可以有效地减少关联交易; 上市公司关联交易规模与高级管理人员现金薪酬成反相关关系; 当董事长兼任总经理时, 关联交易规模会显著增大, 反映了公司经营权力的高度集中容易导致内部控制机制的失效。


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Correspondence to Songhua Hu.

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About this article


  • related-party transactions
  • ownership structure
  • corporate governance
  • investor protection


  • 关联交易
  • 股权结构
  • 治理结构
  • 投资者保护