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Management ownership and firm performance

Empirical evidence from the panel data of Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2004


This article explores the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Using the panel data of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2004 and the average model, we attempt to avoid some of the deficiencies in research design and performance indicator selection in prior studies. Results show that the proportion of shares held by top management is significantly and positively related to firm performance. Empirical tests of sub-samples in each year confirm the above conclusion.


采用面板模型和平均模型, 利用上市公司2000-2004共5年的面板数据, 探讨맜理层持股与企业绩效的关系, 发现高맜人员(经理、 董事、 监事)持股规模(持股比例及价值)与企业绩效是显著正相关的, 分年度子样本的实证结果进一步支持了该结论。


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Correspondence to Lei Gao.

Additional information

Translated and revised from Caijing yanjiu 财经研究 (The Study of Finance and Economics), 2007, (3): 134–143

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Gao, L., Song, S. Management ownership and firm performance. Front. Bus. Res. China 2, 372–384 (2008).

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  • senior manager
  • ownership
  • corporate performance
  • incentive


  • 高맜人员
  • 所有权
  • 企业绩效
  • 激励