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Related party transactions, benefits of control and earnings quality

Abstract

Controlling shareholders pursue benefits of control (private benefits and shared benefits) via related party transactions, which result in different levels of earnings quality. Using data from all A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets in the year 2001 and 2002, we found that when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%, they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions, giving rise to deterioration in earnings quality. By comparison, when the share ratio is more than 50%, controlling shareholders prefer pursing shared benefits of control through related party transactions, which improve earnings quality as a result.

摘要

控股股东通常使用关联交易追求控制权收益(包括私有收益和共享收益)。 在不同控制权收益驱使下, 关联交易对盈余质量的影响也完全不同, 使用 2001 及 2002 年中国上市公司的数据检验发现, 当控股股东持股在50%及以下时, 更多通过关联交易追求控制权私有收益, 结果降低了盈余质量; 而当控股股东持股超过 50%时, 偏好通过关联交易获取控制权共享收益, 最终提高了盈余质。

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Correspondence to Yan Tong.

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Tong, Y., Wang, H. Related party transactions, benefits of control and earnings quality. Front. Bus. Res. China 2, 187–203 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11782-008-0011-x

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Keywords

  • related party transactions
  • benefits of control
  • earnings quality
  • controlling shareholders

关键词

  • 关联交易
  • 控制权收益
  • 盈余质量
  • 控股股东