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Slotting allowances in China: Theory development and regulation formulation strategy


Under normal market competition, charging suppliers for slotting fees by retailers is a normal business practice. Although it is prevalent in China, the rationalities of slotting fees for established products and linear slotting fees are doubtful. The relevant departments of governments need to supervise and regulate these types of slotting fees. There are two available regulation formulation strategies: we can either learn from Japan to ban explicitly certain types of slotting fees, or learn from America to adopt an attitude of laissez-faire towards slotting allowances.


在一般市场竞争情况下, 收取一次性通道费是一种正常的商业经营模式, 但国内普遍收取的成熟商品通道费和线性通道费的合理性值得质疑, 应成为政府规制政策的对象。 针对目前国内的通道费之争, 可以有两种规制思路: 其一, 可参照日本的规制思路, 明确禁止收取某类通道费。 其二, 可参照美国的思路, 采取少规制甚至不规制策略。


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Correspondence to Xiangdong Liu.

Additional information

Translated and revised from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2007, (7): 164–165

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About this article


  • slotting allowances
  • suppliers
  • retailers
  • welfare


  • 通道费
  • 生产商
  • 零售商
  • 福利