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Counterbalance mechanism of blockholders and tunneling of cash dividend: Evidences from Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003


In this paper, due to the important influence of corporate governance on corporate financial behaviors and from an angle of corporate governance, we develop six hypotheses based on overseas and home relevant researches and data of Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003, and then we do hypotheses testes with regression models to examine the impact of share percent of the top 5 shareholders and counterbalance mechanism among blockholders on cash dividend distribution of listed companies, and to explore influence and counterbalance mechanisms in tunneling of cash dividend which derived from the special phenomena of “same shares same rights but different price”. We find that share percent of top 5 shareholders, control ability (or combined control ability) and balance degree (or combined balance degree) of blockholders have important influence on tunneling of cash dividend distribution. Lastly, the paper proposes five suggestions to restrict controlling shareholders to enlist private benefits from tunneling of cash dividend and to protect rights and interests of small and medium shareholders.


鉴于公司的财务行为受到公司治理因素的影响, 我们从公司治理的角度, 基于国内外的相关研究提出6个研究假设, 然后构建回归模型, 依据1999–2003年中国上市公司数据进行假设检验, 具体探讨前五大股东持股比例以及在此基础上大股东之间的监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响, 研究因为中国股市 “同股同权不同价” 的特殊现象而导致的现金股利的 “隧道效应”, 探索其中的影响机制和制衡机制。 研究显示, 前五大股东的持股比例、 大股东控制力 (或联合控制力) 、 大股东制衡度 (或联合制衡度) 对派发现金股利的 “隧道效应” 存在重要影响。 最后, 我们给出5点建议, 试图限制控股股东通过现金股利的 “隧道效应” 谋取私利, 保护中小股东的正当权益。


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Correspondence to Tang Yuejun.

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Translated and revised from Nankai Jingji Yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Studies), 2006, (1): 60–78

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Tang, Y., Xie, R. & Zhang, C. Counterbalance mechanism of blockholders and tunneling of cash dividend: Evidences from Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003. Front. Bus. Res. China 1, 521–543 (2007).

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