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Audit committee, board characteristics and quality of financial reporting: An empirical research on Chinese securities market


Board independence and the board’s expertise characteristics are key factors influencing the quality of financial reporting. Companies, having a higher percentage of independent directors, having independent financial directors, or having an audit committee on board are more likely to generate quality accounting earnings information. Variables representing board behavior characteristics, namely, ratio of shares owned by the board, board meeting frequency within a year, and the number of independent directors holding posts concurrently in the controlling shareholder’s company, are not significantly related to the quality of financial reporting. Board meeting frequency is even abnormally negatively related to the quality of financial reporting.


董事会的独立性、专业性特征是影响我国上市公司财务呈报质量的重要因素, 公司拥有更高比例的独立董事、拥有财务独立董事、或者设有审计专门委员会, 均能更好地抑制公司的盈余맜理动机或程度, 从而呈报更高质量的会计盈余信息。 然而作为表征董事会行为特征的变量, 如董事会的持股水平、董事会年度会议频率和兼任控股股东职务等, 却与公司盈余质量之间没有显著关系, 甚至会议频率与盈余质量之间出现了反常的负相关关系。


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Correspondence to Wu Qinghua.

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Translated from Guangli Pinglun 管理评论 (Business Review), 2006, (7): 49–56

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Wu, Q., Wang, P. & Yin, J. Audit committee, board characteristics and quality of financial reporting: An empirical research on Chinese securities market. Front. Bus. Res. China 1, 385–400 (2007).

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