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Table 4 The mediating effects of the HPR on corporate innovation

From: Home purchase restriction, real estate investment, and corporate innovation

Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Y = RDit

Y = RDit

Y = RDit

Y = RDit

HPR _ Sit

0.0686**

0.0615**

  

(2.259)

(2.027)

  

Difference in HPR _ Sit Coefficients

Diff. = 0.0071

  

Chi-square = 3.01*

  

HPR _ WAit

  

0.3688**

0.3370**

  

(2.162)

(1.984)

Difference in HPR _ WAit Coefficients

  

Diff. = 0.0318

  

Chi-square = 2.87*

RE

 

−0.0097*

 

−0.0107*

 

(−1.705)

 

(−1.930)

Sizeit

0.6920***

0.6917***

0.6907***

0.6904***

(15.250)

(15.250)

(15.181)

(15.191)

LEVit

−0.1376

−0.1342

−0.1388

−0.1347

(−0.934)

(−0.911)

(−0.941)

(−0.915)

Growthit

0.0182

0.0186

0.0171

0.0176

(0.701)

(0.714)

(0.658)

(0.678)

ROAit

0.6437**

0.6448**

0.6463**

0.6472**

(2.423)

(2.427)

(2.428)

(2.431)

Top5it

0.5845***

0.5849***

0.6077***

0.6053***

(3.350)

(3.354)

(3.501)

(3.491)

Stateit

−0.2143*

− 0.2150*

−0.2153*

−0.2158*

(−1.851)

(−1.857)

(− 1.862)

(− 1.866)

Constant

1.1977

1.2342

1.2015

1.2438

(1.109)

(1.143)

(1.110)

(1.149)

Industry FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Firm FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

No. of obs.

11,786

11,786

11,786

11,786

Number of firms

1830

1830

1830

1830

R2: within

0.4646

0.4648

0.4644

0.4647

  1. Notes. ***, **, and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; parentheses are t values (thereinafter)