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Table 4 The mediating effects of the HPR on corporate innovation

From: Home purchase restriction, real estate investment, and corporate innovation

Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Y = RDit Y = RDit Y = RDit Y = RDit
HPR _ Sit 0.0686** 0.0615**   
(2.259) (2.027)   
Difference in HPR _ Sit Coefficients Diff. = 0.0071   
Chi-square = 3.01*   
HPR _ WAit    0.3688** 0.3370**
   (2.162) (1.984)
Difference in HPR _ WAit Coefficients    Diff. = 0.0318
   Chi-square = 2.87*
RE   −0.0097*   −0.0107*
  (−1.705)   (−1.930)
Sizeit 0.6920*** 0.6917*** 0.6907*** 0.6904***
(15.250) (15.250) (15.181) (15.191)
LEVit −0.1376 −0.1342 −0.1388 −0.1347
(−0.934) (−0.911) (−0.941) (−0.915)
Growthit 0.0182 0.0186 0.0171 0.0176
(0.701) (0.714) (0.658) (0.678)
ROAit 0.6437** 0.6448** 0.6463** 0.6472**
(2.423) (2.427) (2.428) (2.431)
Top5it 0.5845*** 0.5849*** 0.6077*** 0.6053***
(3.350) (3.354) (3.501) (3.491)
Stateit −0.2143* − 0.2150* −0.2153* −0.2158*
(−1.851) (−1.857) (− 1.862) (− 1.866)
Constant 1.1977 1.2342 1.2015 1.2438
(1.109) (1.143) (1.110) (1.149)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
No. of obs. 11,786 11,786 11,786 11,786
Number of firms 1830 1830 1830 1830
R2: within 0.4646 0.4648 0.4644 0.4647
  1. Notes. ***, **, and * denote the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively; parentheses are t values (thereinafter)