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Table 10 The moderating effects of outside monitoring and family size

From: Non-family chair and corporate performance

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Institutional development

Analyst coverage

# of times on Hurun

China Rich List

Ownership balance

One-child policy

NFChair

−0.021***

− 0.014***

− 0.016***

− 0.018***

−0.007*

 

(−3.81)

(−4.29)

(− 4.55)

(−5.39)

(−1.87)

Setting

0.000

0.002***

−0.002***

−0.001***

− 0.002

 

(1.40)

(14.58)

(−3.06)

(−3.81)

(−0.90)

NFChair*Setting

0.001*

0.001**

0.002*

0.001**

−0.010*

 

(1.76)

(2.58)

(1.85)

(2.35)

(−1.80)

Size

0.016***

0.006***

0.018***

0.015***

0.016***

 

(10.41)

(3.70)

(10.32)

(9.84)

(10.34)

Leverage

−0.036***

−0.037***

−0.035***

− 0.039***

−0.036***

 

(−4.37)

(−4.46)

(−4.17)

(− 4.63)

(− 4.10)

MB

−0.001

−0.001

− 0.001

−0.001*

− 0.001

 

(−1.31)

(−1.32)

(−1.38)

(− 1.72)

(− 1.15)

Board

−0.000

− 0.000

− 0.000

0.001

− 0.000

 

(− 0.01)

(− 0.04)

(− 0.07)

(0.22)

(− 0.01)

Independence

− 0.012

−0.006

− 0.012

−0.012

− 0.014

 

(−0.52)

(− 0.28)

(− 0.54)

(−0.53)

(− 0.61)

Duality

−0.004

− 0.005**

−0.004

− 0.003

−0.003

 

(− 1.62)

(−2.14)

(−1.58)

(− 1.56)

(− 1.16)

Top1

0.001***

0.000***

0.001***

0.001***

0.001***

 

(6.91)

(5.68)

(7.83)

(6.54)

(6.83)

Top25

0.001***

0.000***

0.001***

 

0.001***

 

(5.07)

(3.08)

(5.41)

 

(5.08)

Institution

0.002***

0.001***

0.002***

0.002***

0.002***

 

(8.22)

(3.61)

(8.13)

(8.77)

(8.24)

Foreign

0.001

0.007

0.002

0.003

0.002

 

(0.13)

(0.98)

(0.23)

(0.41)

(0.25)

Tangibility

−0.005

0.001

−0.004

−0.010

−0.008

 

(−0.55)

(0.16)

(− 0.46)

(−1.11)

(− 0.86)

Firm age

− 0.000

0.000

− 0.000

−0.000**

− 0.000

 

(−0.90)

(0.57)

(−0.83)

(−2.02)

(−1.20)

CapEx

0.013

−0.018

0.009

0.019

0.009

 

(0.78)

(−1.13)

(0.57)

(1.15)

(0.52)

Intercept

−0.292***

−0.130***

− 0.345***

−0.263***

− 0.295***

 

(−8.33)

(−3.61)

(−8.84)

(−7.64)

(−8.27)

Industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Obs.

7902

7844

7902

7902

7676

Adjusted R2

0.170

0.203

0.170

0.165

0.167

  1. This table presents the results of the regressions which examine the moderating effects of outside monitoring and the family attribute on the relation between having a non-family chair and firm performance. We use the development of the institutional environment, the number of analysts following, the number of times the controller was included on the Hurun China Rich List, the balance of ownership structure, and the number of children in the family. Institutional development is indicated by the index measuring the development of market intermediaries and the legal environment at the province level. We use the one-child policy to proxy whether the controlling shareholders have a limited number of children. All regressions include year and industry dummies, but their coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity. See the Appendix for detailed descriptions of the variables. The values in parentheses are standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively