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Table 7 CSR Measured by RKS Index

From: Can returnee managers promote CSR performance? Evidence from China

 

RKS_Score i,t

RKS_Level i,t

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Returnee (0/1) i,t

3.182***

 

0.794***

 

(2.63)

 

(2.79)

 

Returnee number i,t

 

1.913**

 

0.475**

 

(2.41)

 

(2.52)

State control (0/1) i,t

−1.724

−1.711

−0.271

−0.268

(−0.95)

(−0.92)

(−0.59)

(−0.57)

Board Independence i,t

−4.232

−3.830

−1.384

−1.285

(−0.47)

(−0.43)

(−0.66)

(−0.61)

Power balance i,t

−0.040

−0.038

−0.006

−0.005

(−0.67)

(−0.65)

(−0.41)

(−0.38)

Duality (0/1) i,t

−0.762

−0.757

−0.137

−0.136

(−0.93)

(−0.94)

(−0.70)

(−0.70)

Managerial ownership i,t

1.100

1.444

0.685

0.772

(0.35)

(0.45)

(0.90)

(1.00)

Institutional ownership i,t

1.463

1.721

0.447

0.510

(0.69)

(0.81)

(0.89)

(1.01)

Firm age i,t

−0.270**

−0.269**

−0.056**

−0.056**

(−2.39)

(−2.37)

(−2.06)

(−2.04)

Size i,t

3.928***

3.837***

0.956***

0.934***

(7.99)

(7.99)

(8.17)

(8.21)

ROA i,t

7.008

7.496

1.742

1.868

(1.16)

(1.22)

(1.18)

(1.25)

Leverage i,t

−0.937

−1.042

−0.233

−0.259

(−0.39)

(−0.43)

(−0.40)

(−0.45)

Intercept

−43.271***

−41.373***

−12.944***

−12.487***

(−3.90)

(−3.81)

(−4.89)

(−4.84)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2414

2414

2391

2391

Adjusted R-squared

0.21

0.22

0.21

0.22

  1. Notes. (1) ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, using two tailed tests. (2) We report in parentheses t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered within firm, and are robust to heteroscedasticity. (3) All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. (4) See Appendix A for variable definitions