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Table 5 Regression Results of Propensity Score Matching

From: Can returnee managers promote CSR performance? Evidence from China

 

Y = CSR_Score i,t

Y = CSR_Rate i,t

(1)

(2)

(4)

(5)

Returnee (0/1) i,t

1.274

 

0.054*

 

(1.56)

 

(1.66)

 

Returnee number i,t

 

0.862**

 

0.035**

 

(2.53)

 

(2.48)

State control (0/1) i,t

1.116

−0.329

0.014

0.000

(0.39)

(−0.14)

(0.12)

(0.00)

Board Independence i,t

3.047

12.268

0.131

0.526

(0.31)

(1.52)

(0.33)

(1.59)

Power balance i,t

−0.052

−0.005

−0.002

−0.001

(−0.91)

(−0.11)

(−0.91)

(−0.59)

Duality (0/1) i,t

−0.042

−1.600*

−0.012

−0.056

(−0.04)

(−1.79)

(−0.27)

(−1.53)

Managerial ownership i,t

1.424

−0.431

−0.050

−0.088

(0.39)

(−0.15)

(−0.33)

(−0.74)

Institutional ownership i,t

10.648***

14.763***

0.354***

0.547***

(4.87)

(7.42)

(4.03)

(6.70)

Firm age i,t

−0.002

0.041

0.000

0.002

(−0.02)

(0.55)

(0.08)

(0.50)

Size i,t

6.833***

6.825***

0.243***

0.240***

(16.05)

(19.04)

(14.20)

(16.32)

ROA i,t

66.604***

84.315***

1.684***

1.786***

(8.67)

(14.04)

(5.45)

(7.25)

Leverage i,t

−7.241***

−5.911***

−0.242**

−0.165**

(−3.03)

(−3.05)

(−2.52)

(−2.08)

Intercept

−121.646***

−134.466***

−2.983***

−3.412***

(−12.72)

(−16.34)

(−7.75)

(−10.11)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2248

2248

2248

2248

Adjusted R–squared

0.32

0.38

0.25

0.28

  1. Notes. (1) ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, using two tailed tests. (2) We report in parentheses t–statistics based on standard errors that are clustered within firm, and are robust to heteroscedasticity. (3) All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. (4) See Appendix A for variable definitions