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Table 10 Information Asymmetry, Returnee Managers and CSR

From: Can returnee managers promote CSR performance? Evidence from China

Y = CSR_Score i,t

DA > Median

DA < Median

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Returnee (0/1) i,t

2.350**

 

1.660*

 

(2.16)

 

(1.70)

 

Returnee number i,t

 

1.937***

 

0.923

 

(3.38)

 

(1.48)

State control (0/1) i,t

−1.419

−1.400

−3.406**

−3.400**

(−0.71)

(−0.70)

(−2.41)

(−2.41)

Board independence i,t

10.220

10.888

10.810

10.809

(1.29)

(1.38)

(1.57)

(1.58)

Power balance i,t

−0.082*

−0.083*

−0.057

−0.057

(−1.70)

(−1.73)

(−1.20)

(−1.20)

Duality (0/1) i,t

−1.475*

−1.477*

−0.003

−0.001

(−1.94)

(−1.95)

(−0.00)

(−0.00)

Managerial ownership i,t

0.045

0.293

2.370

2.330

(0.02)

(0.13)

(1.23)

(1.21)

Institutional ownership i,t

10.197***

10.300***

15.135***

15.170***

(5.54)

(5.62)

(8.19)

(8.22)

Firm age i,t

0.070

0.068

0.041

0.038

(0.89)

(0.87)

(0.63)

(0.57)

Size i,t

7.106***

7.018***

5.803***

5.783***

(18.77)

(18.44)

(18.25)

(18.10)

ROA i,t

81.707***

81.651***

73.754***

73.796***

(12.97)

(12.91)

(16.56)

(16.57)

Leverage i,t

−8.577***

−8.494***

−2.663*

−2.670*

(−4.70)

(−4.65)

(−1.81)

(−1.81)

Intercept

−138.456***

−136.844***

−112.011***

−111.470***

(−15.43)

(−15.18)

(−14.63)

(−14.55)

Year

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

4631

4631

4888

4888

Adjusted R-squared

0.32

0.32

0.36

0.36

  1. Notes. (1) ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, using two tailed tests. (2) We report in parentheses t-statistics based on standard errors that are clustered within firm, and are robust to heteroscedasticity. (3) All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. (4) See Appendix A for variable definitions. (5) We can get similar results when we use CSR_Rate to proxy for CSR, the results are available upon requests