- Research Article
- Published:
How to improve the performance of R&D alliance? An empirical analysis based on China’s pharmaceutical industry
Frontiers of Business Research in China volume 4, pages 130–147 (2010)
Abstract
The separation of science resources and the manufacturing industry in China has given rise to R&D alliances between R&D institutes and sponsoring enterprises. As a result, R&D alliance of various types has become a main route of technology innovation in China. Drawing upon relevant literature on R&D alliance management, this research empirically explores the impacts of relationship pattern, control strategy chosen by sponsoring enterprises, and alliance members’ continuity expectation on alliance performance. Results show that motivation-based alliance control approaches, including proper allocation of alliance control rights, sustained strengthening of alliance members’ continuity expectation, and enhancement of mutual relationship and friendship among alliance members, are more effective than process or outcome control approaches for improving alliance performance.
References
Aghion P, Tirole J (1994). On the management of innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1185–1209
Anderson J C, Narus J A (1990). A model of distributor firm and manufacturing firm working partnerships. Journal of Marketing, 54: 42–58
Andrew C I, Currall S C (2004). The coevolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures. Organization Science, 15(5): 586–599
Aulakh P, Kotabe M, Sahay A (1996). Trust and performance in cross-border marketing partnerships: A behavioral approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5): 1005–1032
Das T K, Teng B S (2001). Trust, control, and risk in strategic alliances: An integrated framework. Organization Studies, 22(2): 251–283
Dwyer F, Schurr R, Paul H, Oh S (1987). Developing buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing, 51(April): 11–28
Eccles R G, Crane D B (1987). Managing through networks in investment banking. California Management Review, 30(1): 176–195
Eisenhardt K M (1985). Control: Organizational and economic approaches. Management Science, 31(2): 134–149
Grossman S, Hart O (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 691–719
Gulati R (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 85–112
International Institute for Management Development (IMD) (2003). World Competitiveness Yearbook International Institute for Management Development (IMD) (2005). World Competitiveness Yearbook
Jonathan L (2003). Relational incentive contracts. The American Economic Review, 93(3): 835–857
Lerner J, Merges R P (1998). The control of technology alliances: An empirical analysis of the biotechnology industry. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(2): 125–156
Lui S, Ngo H (2004). The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation in non-equity alliance. Journal of Management, 30(4): 471–485
Macneil I R (1978). Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical and relational contract law. Northwestern University Law Review, 72(6): 854–905
Moorman C, Deshpandé R, Zaltman G (1993). Factors affecting trust in market research relationships. Journal of Marketing, 57(1): 81–101
Morgan R M, Hunt S D (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(3): 20–38
OECD (1991). The nature of innovation and the evolution of the productive system. technology and productivity-The challenge for economic policy. Paris: OECD, 14–303
Ouchi W (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms. Manage Science, 25: 833–848
Poppo L, Zenger T (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as a substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23: 707–725
Lui S S, Ngo H Y (2004). The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation in non-equity alliances. Journal of Management, 30(4): 471–485
Williamson O E (1991). Transaction cost economics and organization theory. Industrial and Corporate Change, (2): 107–156
刘 学 (Liu Xue) (2001). 企业技术的获得: 内部化与市场的优劣势比较 (Getting technologies: A comparison between advantages and disadvantages of internalization and market). 科技导报, (8): 38–41
刘 学, 马 宏建 (Liu Xue, Ma Hongjian) (2004). 研究开发联盟中的控制权配置: 中国制药产业的研究 (Control rights allocation in R&D alliance: Research of China’s pharmaceutical industry). 数量经济技术经济研究, (6): 28–38
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
__________
Translated from Guanli Xuejia 管理学家 (学术版) (Management Magazine (Academic)), 2008, (4): 316–326
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Liu, X., Xiang, X., Jiang, L. et al. How to improve the performance of R&D alliance? An empirical analysis based on China’s pharmaceutical industry. Front. Bus. Res. China 4, 130–147 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11782-010-0006-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11782-010-0006-2